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Abstract 
The understanding of parliamentary members on the scope of their institutional authorities in the budget includes 
the discussing of the formulation of policies (KUA and PPAS) and the operational planning of the budget 
including the details of activities and the types of expenditure. This understanding is constructed from the 
perception of the parliamentary leadership which identifies the parliament’s budgeting functions witht those of 
the heads of the regions, even in the final stages of the budgeting process which is understood as the exercising 
of the function to form Perda(s) (non-APB). This understanding is manifested in practice, motivated by the 
provisions in Law No. 17 of 2003 dan PP No. 16 of 2010 which grants the authority to discuss the budget in 
detail, the quality of the budget proposed by the local government, the motivation to be re-elected as a member 
of the parliament by relying on the local budget as a mechanism to finance campaign promises, and efforts to 
restore the political costs of the concerned member’s candidacy. 
Keywords: DPRD’s Authority; APBD. 
 
1. Introduction 
The previous article has revealed the limits of the parliament’s authority in the budgeting process,1 which is to 
discuss the formulation of budgeting policies (KUA and PPAS) and the operational planning of the budget (RKA 
SKPD which is compiled into the draft APBD), to guarantee consistency: (1) KUA and PPAS drafts with the 
RKPD; dan (2) Perda APBD draft with the KUA, PPAS dan RKPD, whose scope is limitied to : (a) income, 
expenditure and funding policies; (b) quality and quantity (budget allocation) programs; and (c) quality of 
activities (not including quantity or budget allocation). 
This makes it clear that the parliament’s authority in the budgeting process is the embodiment of the 
performing of the parliament’s budgeting functions.. Conceptually, the budgeting function of the parliament is 
none other than supervision or control, namely apriori fiscal oversight. However, in positive law, the 
parliament’s budgeting function, by way of Law No. 17 Year 2004 and PP No. 16 Year 2010 is identified as the 
functions of the head of the region, even procedurally it is identified with the formation of local regulations 
(Perda), meanwhile, Law No. 23 Year 2014 and its implementing regulations is identified as supervisory 
activities at the time the budget was set which is distinguished from overseeing activities at the time of execution. 
This last activity is called the function of oversight. 
With the construction differences, we try to examine parliament’s perspective on the budgeting process. 
This inquiry can uncover the mainstream view of the legislators of the nature or content of parliament’s 
budgeting function, which is reflected in the practice of how the budget discussion conducted.  
In relation with the practice of budget discussions, the previous article has also revealed the extent of 
parliamentary authority in the budgeting process. Parliament position themselves as budget composers and at the 
same time its overseers. The extent of that authority raises the pressure on regional government to carry out their 
functions, even more dangerous is the breadth of such authority which leads to the carrying out of government 
fucntions to become hindered because of political interests in budget talks. Even more worrying are the attempts 
to benefit one’s group or self. Cases of corruption involving legislators and members of parliament have been 
proven in court, their abuse of authority in this case the budgeting authority of individual legislators.  
Therefore, the views of legislators on the limits of their institutional authority in budget 
discussionshould not only rely on the legislative approach, moreover those legislation contain rules that are 
substantially differenty but are about the problem. The legislation mentioned above are Law No. 17 Year 2003 
and PP No. 16 Year 2010 each of which have their own domain of legal regimes namely national finance and 
parliament vis a vis Law No. 23 Year 2014 and its implementing regulations which is the legal regime of 
regional/local governments. 
The conflict of regulations in the legal regime of national finance and parliaments with the legal regime 
regional governments can be overcome by utilizing the legal principle of ‘lex specialis derogat legi generali’. In 
this context, the legal regime of regional governments is the ‘lex specialis’ to the legal regime of national finance 
and the legal regime of parliaments ‘lex generali’. What makes the legal regime of regional governments lies in 
its function as constitutive guide G.J. Wolhoff analogizes laws on regional/local governments as the constitution 
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for regions/districts in a united state, as is the case with state constitutions for federations.1 
The budgeting process which involves the role of parliament is a part of regional administration, and 
therefore must be regulated in a law on regional governments as the principal law and is special when compared 
to other laws. If there are laws that govern differently, the law on regional governments should be prioritized.2 
But, notwithstanding that analysis, legislators as discussants of the budget have their own view that 
differ from that or may be different from Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi RI No. 35/PLAW-XII/2013 in the 
Pengujian Undang-Undang Nomor 27 Year 2009 tentang Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, dan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, dan Undang-Undang Nomor 17 
Year 2003 tentang Keuangan Negara terhadap Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Year 1945 
case. Even different from the contents of Surat Mendagri No. 902/3224/SJ dated 24 June 2014, which limits 
parliament’s authority to discuss the budget only up to program details and does not dive into activity details and 
types of expenditure. 
From parliament’s perspective, the Constitutional Court did have any legtal effects on the scope of 
parliament’s authority in the budgeting process, because the subject matter being examined and decided by the 
Court is not directly nor indirectly concerned with their authority. The institution subject to the Court’s decision 
is not the region’s parliament, but the national parliament. Likewise, the Minister of Home Affairs’ letter is 
judged as having not legal effect on parliament’s authority in discussing the budget, because it is contrary to Law 
No. 17 Year 2003.3 This perspective, shows that the parliament’s perspective on the scope of its authority in the 
budgeting process in accordance with the provisions of legislations in the field of national/public finance.  Such 
a perspective is certainly backed by a variety of vactors behind those arguments or reasons. Those various 
factors will also be analyzed and presented in this article. 
 
2. DPRD’s Authority to Discuss the Budget 
The scope of parliament’s authority to discuss the budget is not symmetrical with its authority to approve of the 
budget. In accordance with the nature of the budgeting function it has, parliament is not in a composing position 
which requires it to master the technical composing of the budget, but rather as a watchdog standing guard and 
guaranteeing the consistency of developmental planning documents (RKPD) with budgeting (KUA, PPAS, and 
RKA SKPD that will be compiled into a draft budget). Therefore because of the rationality of the discussion 
conducted by the parliament is political and not technocratic as when regional governments compose their 
budgets. So parliament only focuses only on the suitability of the budget policy formulation (KUA and PPAS) 
with design planning (RKPD), and operational budget planning (draft budget/’RKA SKPD compilation’) with 
budget policy formulations, the PPAS and RKPD, not the technical budget figures (budget allocation for each 
activity and type of expenditure). 
On that issue, the understanding of individual legislators relative to draft KUA and PPAS discussions, is 
reflected by the substance of the thoughts of parliament, claimed to be a result of filtering society’s aspirations, 
which substance may deviate from the RKPD’s and intended to be inserted as KUA and PPAS. It is an implied 
understanding that the discussion regarding the draft KUA and PPAS by parliament gives the impression that 
parliament composes the budget. Furthermore, it also suggests that parliament positions itself as the regional 
development planner, becoming a competitor of the local government. (read: Bappeda). 
The usage of the parliament’s Pokir DPRD which tolerates ‘changes’ to the   RKPD certainly has 
implications on the substance of PPAS that has been mutually agreed upon by the parliament and the regional 
government, may be different from the RKPD. A further implication is that the draft budget which is a 
compilation of RKA SKPD will also be different from the RKPD, because the RKA SKPD is prepared in 
accordance with PPAS. Development planning activities are disconnected, not integrated with budgeting 
activities. 
Integrating parliament's Pokir into the budgeting process also happens during the discussion of the RKA 
SKPD in the preliminary discussion forum. This shows that the concerned legisators champion the laws on 
national finance more as opposed to those on regional governments. The RKA SKPD discussion dives into the 
details of activities and the types of expenditure to test its consistency with PPAS. Even though, PPAS itself does 
not contain details of activities and types of expenditure. Then, how could they test the consistency of RKA 
SKPD with PPAS. 
The understanding of the concerned legislators about the scope of RKA SKPD which dives into five 
unis (types of expenditure) apply mutatis mutandis to the discussion of the next process, the discussion of the 
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draft budget. In the framework of budget proposal discussions, once again, parliament in commissionary 
meetings or in joint committees discuss the programs and the proposed program’s budget allocation. Discussion 
of the budget proposal is the final discussion on its approval into the budget. In accordance with the specialties 
principle in Law No. 17 Year 2003 which requires the specific or detailed allocation of the budget up to the types 
of expenditure then the discussion and approval must also be detailed. 
At the time of the drafting of the budget, the commission may submit a proposal which results in a 
change in the amount of revenues and expenditure in the draft budget. When linked to the scope of the 
discussion which dives to the type of expenditure as understood by the legislators concerned, it is conceivable 
that the commission’s proposal would change the allocation of the budget to the level of the type of expenditure. 
If the arguments becoming mainstreams in the commission or in the joint committee requires a change in the 
budget allocation on the level of the type of expenditure, the proposal is sure to be aimed at that level. 
It is clear that legislators understand the budgeting function attached to their institution as the function 
to form Perda (formerly: the legislative function). Such understanding has put the legislators as the composer of 
policy formulas and operational planners of the budget which is similar to the budgeting function regional 
governments have (read: head of the region). Parliament is understood as if they have authority to tamper with 
the budget allocation through their proposals which are portrayed as ‘counter budget proposals’ which must be 
integrated into the draft budget in order for the draft to be approved of. 
In the same vein as the principle of specialties mentioned earlier, it is important this principle is related 
to the implementation of the budget, especially on expenditure. It is stated, for example, in Article 3 Law No. 1 
Year 2004 yang menyatakan ‘Setiap pejabat dilarang melakukan tindakan yang berakibat pengeluaran 
APBN/APBD jika anggaran untuk membiayai pengeluaran tersebut tidak tersedia atau tidak cukup tersedia’. 
The existence of this provision requires that the budget be presented in detail, including the type of expenditure, 
even the details of the object being purchased,1 and the presentation of that detailed budget is certainly done by 
the local government and not the parliament. Because of that the parliament does not actually have to discuss the 
budget in detail up to the activity, type and specifications of the object being purchased, because this institution 
is not the one that drafts and implements the budget. It is on this basis, that changes in the funding between 
activities, types and specifications or what is often called ‘shifting’ the budget does not require the consent of 
parliament. Which means, the budget is shifted without changing/modifying the legislation (Perda APBD), 
because it neither increases nor decreases the (definitive) budget ceiling specified in the budget. The budget is 
shifted simply by changing the head of the region’s regulations on the budget’s description which is used as a 
abasis for implementation.2 
 
2.1.Underlying Factors in the Discussion of Budget Details  
The discourse on the limitations of the parliament’s authority in the budgeting process as described on advance, 
presents two different perspectives: first, normartive an sich which provides an entry point for the parliament to 
discuss budget proposals up to the level of activity details and types of expenditure. This perspective is 
championed in the legal regime of national/regional finance vis a vis the legal regime of regional government. 
Meanwhile, the second perspective, explains theoretically that the legal regime of regional governments is to be 
championed, and thus, the scope of the authority of the parliament is limited up to the level of activity details 
wherein the discussionis limited to quality, in order to test its consistency relative KUA and PPAS, neither 
quantity nor the nominal budget figures. In this context researches prefer the theoretical approach, by 
strengthening the theoretical argyment that parliament’s authority in the budgeting process is an embodiment of 
the oversight function (fiscal), which is the monitoring done at the time the budget is implemented. 
However, in spite of that, discussing the budget proposal is indeed an authority of the parliament; 
therefore the parliament must be involved in the process in accordance with existing legislation. At this time, 
there are two legal regimes which govern this matter, which is the national/regional finance law in this case Law 
No. 17 Year 2003 and the regional/local government law in this case Law No. 23 Year 2014 and its 
implementing regulations. The applicability and the enforceability of these two legal regimes is not the issue, 
because each govern different things (finance and local governments), although there is contact between the two. 
The national finance referred to in Law No. 17 Year 2003 includes regional finance managed through their 
budget, while the governance of the budget is stipulated in Law No. 23 Year 2014 (and its implementing 
regulations). The issue is, Law No. 17 Year 2003 also sets the cycle for financial management, different from 
Law No. 23 Year 2014. In this context the law governing a specific subject overrides the more general law. Law 
No. 23 Year 2014 and its implementing regulations govern a specific subject, namely the exercising of regional 
financial instruments, which includes the region’s financial management cicle. The drafting and adopting of the 
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budget – which is an instrument that drives regional finance – is in truth an embodiment of the executing of 
regional government by the head of the region and the local parliament. Therefore, if there are two different laws, 
the one which is part of the local government regime should be championed.  
That argument is different from the understanding of legislators in at the research site. They tend to 
champion the provisions of Law No. 17 Year 2003, especially those concerning their institutional authority in 
discussing and approving programs and activities to be funded by the budget, including the amount of funds 
allocated up to the details on the types of expenditure. 
Such understanding, cannot be separated from the enforceability of the national/regional legal regime of 
finance in this case Law No. 17 Year 2003 and the parliamentary legal regime in this case PP No. 16 Year 2010 
which regulate the institutional authority of the Parliament in the budgeting process. In understanding the limits 
of their institutional authority, members of parliament tend to champion these two legal regimes. This trend is 
assumed to be caused by the setting of these two legal regimes which is favorable for the members’ positions in 
the budgeting process. They could freely push in certain prograns abd activites as well as nominal budget figures 
into the KUA and PPAS. Meanwhile, local authorities are often powerless against the maneuvers of its partners, 
except when ‘forced’ to accept and formulate it into budget policy. In fact, from the perspective of the regional 
government’s legal regime in this case Permendagri No. 54 Year 2010 – which is the implementation of the 
regional government’s laws, the integration of Pokir is only related to the proposal of programs and activities, is 
unrelated to budget figures, it was done when the regional government c.q. Bappeda, drafting a development 
plan for the yearly building plans of the region is used as the main ingredient in the region’s development plan 
discussions. 
The phenomenon above indicates that the involvement of members of parliament in determining the 
programs and activities as well as the budget figures during the budget formation stage (KUA and PPAS) – also 
in the operational planning of the draft budget – backed by the enforceability of the national/regional legal 
regime of finance – also by the parliament’s disciplinary rules – which allow their involvement thus far. 
In addition to this, the tendency of members of parliament to champion Law No. 17 Year 2003 and PP 
No. 16 Year 2010, as reflected in the relevant parliamentary disciplinary rules is backed by thewill to improve 
the quality of budget proposals made by the regional governemnt (read: head of the region). According to 
Bulukumba District’s paliamentary Head of Budget, Andi Arman, the quality of draft budgets tends to not meet 
expectations because the local government always insists on on maintaining the previous fiscal year’s budgetary 
allocation pattern, without considering their relevance to the issues developing in society. For that, the 
involvement of members of parliament in the detailed discussing of the budget is very important in order to 
improve the quality of the budget proposal. 
For researchers, the problem of the inadequacy of budget proposals is due to ‘incrementalisme’ has 
actually been overcome by the use of a performance-based budgeting approach adopted by Law No. 17 Year 
2003. Performance-based budgeting means that the drafting of the budget is oriented towards the output/ourcome 
of the program/activities to be or has been achieved with respect to the use the budget with the measured 
quantity and quality. Thus, in a performance-based budget, the objective and the performance indicator of a 
certain program/activity must be clearly defined and scalable to support the improvement of efficiency and 
effectiveness in the utilization of resources and the strengthening of the decision-making process in the 
midedium framework. As for problems related to continuity of the funding of multi-year activities canb also be 
overcome by using the budgeting approach of a medium term expenditure framework (MTEF). The medium 
term expenditure budgeting approach is carried out by preparing a forecast of estimated funding requirements for 
the programs and activities planned in the fiscal year after the year being planned and the implicated funding 
required for the implementation of next year’s programs and activities. 
The factors that underlie the involvement of members of parliament in the determining of programs and 
activities as well as budget figures as described above, has been categorized by researchers as internal factors. In 
this context there should be relevant records regarding the categorized enforceability of the national/regional 
financial legal regime in this case Law No. 17 Year 2003 and the parliamentary legal regime in this case PP No. 
16 Year 2010 as internal factors, namely the setting of the two products as the spirit of the rule of order in 
parliament, which is substantially asymmetrical with Law No. 23 Year 2014 and its implementing regulations. 
Outside of these two factors, there are other implied internal factors, namely the motivation to be 
reelected and the reliance on local budgets as mechanism to serve their constituents, or in other words the using 
of the budget as a field for political financing.  
The entry of a number of new programs and activities outside of the yearly budget has a common thread 
with the funds that have been surfacing as of late. On a national level, the funds are designed in such a way to 
become specific programs and activities funded by the budget with the aim to serve their constituents. A number 
of the programs and activities were proposed by the members of parliament through the Pokir mechanism which 
has been integrated into the budget with the same aim in mind, which is to serve its constituents.  
Aside from damaging the design of development planning, the entry of new programs and activities into 
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the budget is also not based on a performance-based budgeting approach, because these programs and activities 
tend to ‘fall from the sky’. The obscurity of performance indicators includes those input, output, outcome, 
benefit and impact of said programs and activities. Budgeting as a continuation of the development planning -  
done at the research site – which seems to defend (proposals) by the parliament’s pokir contained in the RKPD.  
If so, the RKPD embodies the defeat of society’s aspirations by those of the ‘majority’ (parliament’s pokir). 
The influx of new programs and activities outside of the RKPD mechanism into the budget is clear 
proof that the budget is drafted not through a performance approach, but through an approach prioiritizing 
‘political accommodation’ which actually resembles ‘incrementalisme’. Consciously or not, the parliament acts 
ambiguously, becoming a catalyst for the use of the ‘incrementalist’ approach in drafting budget proposals, 
which it criticizes and uses to conduct a detailed discussion of the budget proposal.  
The firm stance of parliament in submitting programs and new activities into the budget can also be 
understood in the context of the party system and elections. Discussion of the budget in parliament is often 
dominated by political factors and not in the direction of a scientific debate discussing the in-depth and particular 
interests of society. Things like this lead to the discussing of a costly budget, colored with negotiation and 
collusion between the regional government and the parliament for the interest of certain groups or individuals. 
The presence of ‘rogue’ members of parliament who take advantage of their position to affect the budget for 
personal or group interests has become common knowledge. This can be seen from the members of parliament 
who were caught engaging in corruption during budget discussions. 
The common thread that can be drawn is, that the dominance of political factors in the discussing of 
budget proposals attracts the interest of parliamentary members to carry out a detailed discussion up to the levekl 
of activity and types of expenditure (a unit of five). The party system practiced today is a multiparty, 
characterized by a number of (more than two) political parties which are the determinants of the regional 
governing process. Such systems, when coupled with a presidential system of government characterized – in this 
case the regional government which follows the system applied at the central level, where the head of 
government cannot be dismissed by parliament because of political reasons - is a difficulty combination,1 it is 
even very likely to give birth to what is called a divided government.2 This difficulty is due to the fatc that there 
is no guarantee that the regional government (read: head of the region) will be approved or endorsed by the 
parliament. To that end, the regional head is often in the position that requires him to bargain through instituting 
a coalition of parties that exist in parliament. 
As in the central government, coalitions are built by the parties who support the head of the region are 
very vulnerable to division, as ‘glue’ is given ‘compensation’ to the coalition’s parties to fight for their interests 
for the sake of solidarity and the stability of the coalition. At this point is the budget’s discussion going to be 
colored by negotiations and collusion etween the regional government and the parliament for their group’s or 
individual interests through the detailed and specific discussion. Furthermore, if wrapped in ‘rent politics’ of 
parties who place their candidates in the parliament to user it as a gold mine, negotiation and collusion can 
happen systemically. 
In the context of the party system, the phenomenon of ‘rent politics’ is a true reflection of partying 
paradigms. Those who become members of the parliament are only figures who have special relationships with 
the leaders of political parties or are the leaders of those political parties. Political parties tend to be oligarchical, 
and sometimes boldly act for and on behalf of the people, but in reality tend to fight for their own sakes. Being a 
member of those parties is seen as a requirement to become a member of parliament. Both positions are held at 
the same time, and the party will simply function as a vehicle for its members to maintain their positions as 
representatives of the people. The motivation to maintain their position as a member of parliament causes the 
politicization of the regional budget. The budget is used as a mechanism to fund the campaign promises of the 
parliament’s and the party’s members by imposing the invclusion of their proposals into the budget. 
Members of the parliament who are not part of coalitions, are also not immune from’rent politics’. With 
the adopting of a proportional election system, being a member of the parliament is obviously not cheap. It 
requires fees of a fantastical amountthat must be borne by the candidate. Thus, all elected candidates, regardless 
of affiliation, will attempt to return their political investments by using their office to affect the regional budget, 
and for that a detailed discussion of the budget is important even obligatory for a member of the parliament. 
 
3. Conclusion 
Based on the elaboration above, it can be concluded that the parliamentary member’s understanding on the scope 
of their institutional authority in the discussing of the budget includes the formulation of policies (KUA and 
PPAS) as well as the operational planning of budgets including the details of activities and the types of 
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expenditure. This understanding is constructed for the parliamentary member’s perception which identifies the 
parliament’s budgeting function with those of the regional government (read: head of the region), even at the 
final stage the budgeting process is understood as a manifestation of the Perda formulation function (nonAPBD). 
The underlying factors which cause members of the parliament to discuss the budget in detail to the activity and 
the type of expenditure are: Law No. 17 Year 2003 memberikan kewenangan membahas anggaran sampai detil; 
the inadequacy of regional APBD proposals; the motivation to be reelected as members of the parliament by 
relying on local budgets as a mechanism to fund campaign promises; and the motivation to refund the costs of 
their reelection. 
Proposed recommendations, firstly, the need for the harmonizing of legislation governing the authority 
of the parliament in the budgeting process Law No. 17 Year 2003 and PP No. 16 Year 2010 should be revised in 
adaptation to Law No. 23 Year 2014. Secondly, the need to regulate the specific technical limits o fthe scope of 
the parliament’s authority in the budgeting processin the parliament’s internal rules by referring to the legal 
regime of local governments in this case Law No. 23 Year 2014 and its implementing regulations, in order to 
reaffirm the parliament’s position that it is an element of regional officials carrying out their budgeting functions 
(apriori fiscal oversight). 
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